This paper provides one more step towards bridging the gap between the formal and computational approaches to the verification of cryptographic protocols. We extend the well-known Abadi-Rogaway logic with probabilistic hashes and give a precise semantic interpretation to it using Canetti's oracle hashes. These are probabilistic polynomial-time hashes that hide all partial information. We show that, under appropriate conditions on the encryption scheme, this interpretation is computationally sound and complete. This can be used to port security results from the formal world to the computational world when considering passive adversaries. We also give an explicit example showing that oracle hashing is not strong enough to obtain such a result for active adversaries.
Introduction
The analysis of security protocols is being carried out mainly by means of two different techniques. On the one hand, there is the logic approach, which sees messages as algebraic objects defined using some formal language. In this view, cryptographic operations are symbolic operations which are unbreakable. Attackers are typically modeled as so-called Dolev-Yao attackers [DY83] , having total control over the network, having no computational limitations, and being only (but absolutely) incapable of breaking cryptographic operations. This view is appealing, because it is relatively easy to use and captures most mistakes commonly made in security protocols.
On the other hand, there is the complexity-based approach. Here messages are bitstrings and cryptographic operations are functions on bit strings satisfying certain security properties [Yao82, GM84, Gol01] . Common security notions like secrecy, authenticity, and integrity are formulated in terms of the probability that someone can mount a successful attack. An attacker here is a resource bounded probabilistic algorithm, limited by running time and/or memory. The complexity based methods are more general and more realistic, but also more complex to use.
In the last few years much research has been done to relate these two perspectives [AR02, AJ01, MW04a, MW04b, Her05, GGvR08] . Such a relation takes the form of a function mapping symbolic messages m to (distributions over) bitstrings [[m] ]. This map then should relate messages that are observationally equivalent in the symbolic world (meaning that a Dolev-Yao attacker can see no difference between them) to indistinguishable distributions over bitstrings (meaning that a computationally bounded adversary can only with negligible probability distinguish the distributions). Such a map allows one to use formal methods, possibly even automated, to reason about security properties of protocols and have those reasonings be valid also in the computational world.
The work carried out in the literature on relating these two perspectives mainly deals with symmetric encryption [AR02, MW04a] and public key encryption [MW04b, Her05] . Several extensions have been proposed dealing, for instance, with key cycles [ABHS05] ; partial information leakage [ABS05] ; active instead of passive adversaries [MW04b] and more realistic security notions [AW05] . Other extensions add new primitives to the logic such as bilinear pairings [Maz07] , modular exponentiation [BLMW07] , and there are also frameworks dealing with generic equational theories [BCK05, ABW06, KM07] .
Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04a] briefly but explicitly question if this logical approach can be extended to, among other things, collision resistant hashes. Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [BPW06] show that in their universal composability framework [PW00] , which deals with active adversaries, a sound interpretation of hashes cannot exist, but that it is possible to give a sound interpretation of formal hashes in the universal composability framework using random oracles. Similar results, also in the random oracle model, have been recently shown by Janvier et al. [JLM07] for passive adversaries and by Cortier et al. [CKKW06] for active adversaries. Random oracles are often used in the literature to model hash functions, although they are also often criticized for being unsound in the standard model; there exist examples of protocols that are secure in the random oracle model but provably insecure for every possible instantiation with a real function [CGH04] .
The problem with hashes is that in the symbolic world h(m) and h(m ′ ) are indistinguishable for a Dolev-Yao attacker if the attacker does not know m or m ′ . In the computational world, however, the normal security definition -it must be computationally infeasible to compute any pre-image of a hash value or a hash collision [RS04] -does not guarantee that the hash function hides all partial information about the message; hence there is no guarantee that their interpretation as bitstrings [[h(m) A possible solution to this can be found in the work of Canetti and others [Can97a, CMR98] on perfectly one-way functions (a.k.a. oracle hashing). These are computable probabilistic hash functions that hide all partial information of their input (see Section 3.3 for the definition and an example).
Our contribution. We propose an extension to the commonly used AbadiRogaway logic of symbolic messages introducing a probabilistic hash operator h r (m) in the logic, next to the probabilistic symmetric encryption operator {|m| } r k . Just as the original logic introduces a 2-operator to put in place of undecryptable ciphertext (for us 2 r , since we also deal with repetitions of ciphertexts), we introduce a ⊠ r -operator to put in place of the hash of an unknown message. In the computational world, we interpret h as a perfectly one-way function H. We prove that if the encryption algorithm E is type-0 secure, the resulting interpretation is sound, extending the result from [AR02] . The same result holds if E is IND-CPA. This result previously appeared, in abbreviated form, as [GvR06] . Furthermore, assuming that the encryption scheme is confusion-free, we prove that the interpretation is complete as well, extending the result from [MW04a] .
For these results, the adversaries under consideration are passive: they do not try to actively modify messages or insert messages into the network. We show that although an oracle hash scheme allows us to port security results from the Dolev-Yao setting to the computational setting with respect to passive adversaries, it does not do so with respect to active adversaries. The reason is the same as for type-0 or IND-CPA encryption schemes: in such an encryption scheme it might be possible for an attacker to modify an encryption E(κ, µ) of µ to the encryption E(κ, f (µ)) of another message that has some relation to µ; similarly, in an oracle hash scheme it might be possible for an attacker to modify the hash of an unknown message µ to the hash of another unknown message that has some relation to µ. Concretely, we construct an explicit oracle hash scheme in which an adversary can create the hash value H(µ ′ µ) given only H(µ) and µ ′ . We stress that passive adversaries are the best that one can hope for as the standard security definitions for hash functions or even hash schemes are not resilient against active adversaries.
Overview. Section 2 introduces the message algebra, including the probabilistic encryption and probabilistic hash operators. It also defines the observational equivalence relation on messages. Section 3 then introduces the computational world, giving the security definitions for encryption and hashes. In Section 4 the semantic interpretation [[−] ] is defined and Section 5 proves the soundness of this interpretation and Section 6 completeness. Section 7 discusses the limitation to passive adversaries. Finally, Section 8 discusses further research directions.
The Symbolic Setting
This section describes the message space and the observational equivalence extending the well-known Abadi-Rogaway logic [AR02] of symbolic messages with hashes. These messages are used to describe cryptographic protocols and the observational equivalence tells whether or not two protocol runs are indistinguishable for a global eavesdropper. Here a protocol run is simply the concatenation of all the messages exchanged in the run.
Definition 2.1 Key is an infinite set of key symbols, Nonce an infinite set of nonce symbols, Const a finite set of constant symbols including 0 and 1, and Random an infinite set of randomness labels. Keys are denoted by k, k ′ , . . . , nonces by n, n ′ , . . . , constants by c, c ′ , . . . , and randomness labels by r, r ′ , . . . . There is one special key called k 2 and for every randomness label r there is a special nonce called n r ⊠ . Using these building blocks, messages are constructed using symbolic encryption, hashing, and pairing operations:
Here k and n do not range over all keys/nonces, but only over the non-special ones. Special symbols ( 2 r and ⊠ r ) are used to indicate undecryptable ciphertexts or hash values of unknown messages. When interpreting messages as (ensembles of distributions over) bitstrings, we will treat 2 r as if it were {|0| } r k2 and ⊠ r as if it were h r (n r ⊠ ). A message of the form {|m| } r k is called an encryption and the set of all such messages is denoted by Enc. Similarly, messages of the form h r (m) are called hash values and the set of all these messages is denoted by Hash. Finally Box denotes the set of all messages of the form 2 r or ⊠ r . The set of all messages that involve a "random choice" at their "top level", i.e., Key ∪ Nonce ∪ Enc ∪ Hash ∪ Box, is denoted by RndMsg. The randomness labels model the fact that our computational encryption scheme is probabilistic: {|m| } r k , {|m| } r k models a repetition (forwarding) of the same ciphertext, whereas {|m| } r k , {|m| } r ′ k models a re-encryption with the same key. Note that our computational hash scheme, oracle hashing, is also probabilistic; hence, also the symbolic hash function is equipped with randomness labels.
The closure of a set U of messages is the set of all messages that can be constructed from U using tupling, detupling, and decryption. It represents the useful information an adversary could deduce knowing U. Note that, due to one-wayness of a hash function, knowing h r (m) does not provide an adversary with any information about m. Similarly, and modeling the randomization of the encryption and hash schemes, building new encryptions or hash values does not give any useful information to the adversary. We also remark that pairs are useful to the adversary for checking if the argument m of a certain hash value h r (m) can be constructed from other messages he already knows.
In contrast, freshly generated keys, nonces, (randomized) encryptions or (randomized) hash values are of no use to the adversary as they will not appear in m.
Definition 2.2 (Closure) Let U be a set of messages. The closure of U, denoted by U , is the smallest set of messages satisfying:
For the singleton set {m}, we write m instead of {m}.
The function pattern : Msg → Msg is a straightforward extension of the same function in Abadi-Rogaway [AR02] which takes a message m and reduces it to a pattern. Intuitively, pattern(m) is the pattern that an attacker sees in a message m and messages with the same pattern (up to renaming) look the same to her. Encryptions with keys the attacker cannot learn (i.e., not in m) are replaced by 2 and hash values of unknown messages by ⊠. Since we allow repetition of ciphertexts and hash values, we have to distinguish between unknown, but equal, ciphertexts 2 r , 2 r and unknown, but distinct, ciphertexts 2 r , 2 r ′ and likewise for hashes. where we overload pattern by defining pattern : Msg × P(Msg) → Msg as
otherwise.
pattern(m, U) = m in any other case.
Here R : Enc ∪ Hash ֒→ Random is an injective function that takes an encryption or a hash value and outputs a tag that identifies its randomness.
The tagging function R is needed to make sure that the function pattern is injective: distinct undecryptable messages should be replaced by distinct boxes and similarly for hashes. Note that instead of using R one could also tacitly assume that randomness labels r used in distinct contexts, such as {|m| } 
In the computational world, security definitions for encryption schemes do not guarantee security when encryption cycles occur. In the symbolic world, however, this poses no problem. Therefore, as in the original setting in [AR02] , for the mapping from the symbolic world to the computational world to be sound, we have to forbid encryption cycles in the symbolic world. with k ′ being a sub-message of m ′ . A message is said to be acyclic if there is no sequence k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n , k n+1 = k 1 of keys such that k i encrypts k i+1 in m for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The Computational Setting
This section gives a brief overview of some of the concepts used in the complexity theoretic approach to security protocols. Much of this is standard; the reader is referred to [GB01, BDJR97] for a thorough treatment of the basic concepts, to [AR02] for the notion of type-0 security for cryptographic schemes (see Section 3.2 below), and to [Can97a] for the notion of oracle hashing (see Section 3.3 below).
In the computational world, messages are elements of Str := {0, 1}
* . Cryptographic algorithms and adversaries are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. When analyzing cryptographic primitives, it is customary to consider probabilistic algorithms that take an element in Param := {1} * as input, whose length scales with the security parameter. By making the security parameter large enough, the system should become arbitrarily hard to break.
This idea is formalized in the security notions of the cryptographic operations. The basic one, which is what is used to define the notion of semantically equivalent messages, is that of computational indistinguishability of probability ensembles over Str. Here a probability ensemble over Str is a sequence {A η } η∈N of probability distributions over Str indexed by the security parameter.
Definition 3.1 (Computational indistinguishability) Two probability ensembles {X η } η∈N and {Y η } η∈N are said to be computationally indistinguishable,
is a negligible function of η.
Recall that a function f : N → N is called negligible if for all positive polynomials p, f (η) ≤ 1/p(η) for large enough η (i.e., if for all positive polynomials p, there exists an η 0 ∈ N such that for all η ∈ N with η > η 0 , f (η) ≤ 1/p(η)).
After a brief interlude on probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms in Section 3.1, we give the formal definition of an encryption scheme and its security notion in Section 3.2 and of oracle hashing in Section 3.3.
Probabilistic Algorithms
In Definition 3.1, the notion of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm was already used. Because we explicitly use two different views of these algorithms and in order to fix notation, we give a more precise definition.
Definition 3.2 Coins is the set {0, 1}
ω , the set of all infinite sequences of 0's and 1's. We equip Coins with the probability distribution obtained by flipping a fair coin for each element in the sequence. To be precise, Coins = {0, 1} ω , F , P . Here F is the σ-field on {0, 1} ω generated by the cones {αβ | β ∈ {0, 1} ω }, α ∈ {0, 1} * and P : F → [0, 1] is the unique measure given on the cones by P({αβ | β ∈ {0, 1} ω }) = 2 −|α| .
Definition 3.3
The result of running a probabilistic algorithm A on an input x ∈ Str is a probability distribution A(x) over Str. When we need to explicitly write the randomness used while running A, we write A(x, ρ) with ρ ∈ Coins. Using this notation,
When confusion is unlikely, we will also denote the support of this probability distribution,
Now suppose that A runs in polynomial time p. Then running A on x cannot use more than p(|x|) coin flips. Letting Coins p(|x|) denote the uniform probability distribution on {0, 1} p(|x|) , we can also write
Encryption Scheme
For each security parameter η ∈ N we let Plaintext η ⊆ Str be a non-empty set of plaintexts, satisfying that for each η ∈ N : Plaintext η ⊆ Plaintext η+1 as in Goldwasser and Bellare [GB01] . Let us define Plaintext = η Plaintext η . There is a set Keys ⊆ Str of keys and also a set Ciphertext ⊆ Str of ciphertexts. Furthermore, there is a special bitstring ⊥ not appearing in Plaintext or Ciphertext. An encryption scheme Π consists of three algorithms:
(1) a (probabilistic) key generation algorithm K : Param → Keys that outputs, given a unary sequence of length η, a randomly chosen element of Keys; (2) a (probabilistic) encryption algorithm E : Keys × Str → Ciphertext ∪ {⊥} that returns, given a key and a bitstring, an element from Ciphertext or ⊥; (3) a (deterministic) decryption algorithm D : Keys × Str → Plaintext ∪ {⊥} that returns, given a key and a ciphertext, an element from Plaintext or ⊥. These algorithms must satisfy that the decryption (with the correct key) of a ciphertext returns the original plaintext. The element ⊥ is used to indicate failure of en-or decryption, although, before hand, there is no requirement that decrypting with the wrong keys yields ⊥. Now we define type-0 security of an encryption scheme as in [AR02] , which is a variant of the standard semantic security definition, enhanced with some extra properties. In particular a type-0 secure encryption scheme is which-key concealing, repetition concealing and length hiding. We refer to the original paper for motivation and explanations on how to achieve such an encryption scheme. The notion of type-0 security makes slightly unrealistic assumptions on the encryption scheme. However our result on hashes does not significantly depend on the specific security notion for the encryption scheme. As in [MP05, Her05, Ban04] , it is possible to replace type-0 security by the standard notion of IND-CPA or IND-CCA by adapting the definition of pattern. For simplicity of the exposition, throughout this paper we adopt the former security notion. 
Here the probabilities are taken over the choice of κ and κ ′ by the key generation algorithm, over the internal coins used by the oracles, and over the internal choices of A. An encryption scheme K, E, D is called type-0 secure if for all polynomial-time adversaries A as above, the advantage Adv A is a negligible function of η. enough η,
In the sequel we need an extra assumption on the encryption scheme, namely that the ciphertexts are well-spread as a function of the coins tosses of E. It means that for all plaintexts µ and all keys κ, no ciphertext is exceptionally likely to occur as the encryption of µ under κ. Note that this does not follow from, nor implies type-0 security. Also note that every encryption scheme running in cipher block chaining mode automatically has this property: the initial vector provides the required randomness.
For completeness it is needed that the decryption algorithm returns reject whenever it is called with a key that was not used to encrypt the message in the first place. The special bitstring ⊥ is used to indicate failure of decryption. This property is called confusion freeness. See [MW04a] , where the completeness for the original Abadi-Rogaway logic is proven. Definition 3.6 (Confusion freeness) Let Π = K, E, D be an encryption scheme indexed by the security parameter η. Π is said to be confusion free if for all bitstrings µ the probability
Oracle Hashing
The underlying secrecy assumptions behind formal or Dolev-Yao hashes [DY83] are very strong. It is assumed that given a hash value f (x), it is not possible for an adversary to learn any information about the pre-image x. In the literature this idealization is often modeled with the random oracle [BR93] . Such a primitive is not computable and therefore it is also an idealization. Practical hash functions like SHA or MD5 are very useful cryptographic primitives but have no proven security guaranties. Moreover, under the traditional security notions (one-wayness), a function that reveals half of its input might still be secure. In addition, any deterministic hash function f leaks partial information about x, namely f (x) itself. Throughout this paper we consider a new primitive introduced by Canetti [Can97a] called oracle hashing, that mimics what semantic security is for encryption schemes. This hash function is probabilistic and therefore it needs a verification function, just as in a signature scheme. A hash scheme consists of two algorithms H and V. The probabilistic algorithm H : Param × Str → Str takes a unary sequence and a message and outputs a hash value; the verification algorithm V : Str × Str → {0, 1} that given two messages x and c correctly decides whether c is a hash of x or not. As an example we reproduce here a hash scheme proposed in the original paper. Let p be a large (i.e., scaling with η) safe prime (i.e., a prime of the form 2q + 1 where q is also prime). Take H(x) = r 2 mod p, r 2·f (x) mod p , where r is a randomly chosen element in Z * p and f is any collision resistant hash function. The verification algorithm V(x, a, b ) just checks whether b = a f (x) mod p. We consider two security notions for such a hash scheme. The first one, proposed by Canetti [Can97a] and later revisited in [CMR98] , oracle indistinguishability, guarantees that an adversary can gain no information at all about a bitstring, given its hash value (or rather, with sufficiently small probability). The second one, more standard, is an appropriate form of collision resistance. It guarantees that an adversary cannot (or rather, again, with sufficiently small probability) compute two distinct messages that successfully pass the verification test with the same hash value.
Definition 3.7 (Oracle indistinguishability) A hash scheme H,V is said to be oracle indistinguishable if for every family of probabilistic polynomialtime predicates {D η : Str → {0, 1}} η∈N and every positive polynomial p there is a polynomial size family {L η } η∈N of subsets of Str such that for all large enough η and all x, y ∈ Str \ L η :
.
Here the probabilities are taken over the choices made by H and the choices made by D η . This definition is the non-uniform [Gol01] version of oracle indistinguishability proposed by Canetti [Can97a] as it is used in the proofs in Appendix B of the full version [Can97b] .
Definition 3.8 (Collision resistance) A hash scheme H, V is said to be collision resistant if for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the probability
Interpretation
Section 2 describes a setting where messages are symbolic terms generated by some grammar. In Section 3 messages are bitstrings and operations are given by probabilistic algorithms operating on bitstrings. This section shows how to map symbolic messages to (distributions over) bitstrings. This interpretation is very much standard. We refer to [AR02,AJ01,MW04a] for a thorough explanation. In particular this section introduces notation that allows us to assign, beforehand, some of the random coin flips used for the computation of the interpretation of a message. This notation becomes useful throughout the soundness proof.
Tagged representation. Throughout this paper we assume that it is always possible to recover the type information of a message from its bitstring representation. This can be easily achieved by adding the necessary type tags to the bitstring representation. We will abstract from this representation by overloading the notation. We use Greek letters for bitstrings and µ represents a bitstring of a generic type. We write µ 1 µ 2 for a pair of bitstrings (in [AR02] this would be written as (µ 1 , µ 2 ), "pair" ); ǫ for a ciphertext; κ for a key; ψ for a hash value; ν for a nonce and ς for a constant. 
Note that R(m) is nearly equal to the set of all sub-messages of m that are in RndMsg; the only difference is that R(m) also may contain the special key k 2 or special nonces n r ⊠ . When interpreting a message m as (ensembles of distributions over) bitstrings (Definition 4.3 below), we will first choose a sequence of coin flips for all elements of R(m) and use these sequences as source of randomness for the appropriate interpretation algorithms.
Definition 4.2 For every finite subset X of RndMsg we define Coins(X) as {τ | τ : X → Coins}. We equip Coins(X) with the induced product probability distribution. Furthermore, for every message m we write Coins(m) instead of Coins (R(m) ).
An element of τ of Coins(m) gives, for every sub-message m ′ of m that requires random choices when interpreting this sub-message as a bitstring, an infinite sequence τ (m ′ ) of coin flips that will be used to resolve the randomness. Now we are ready to give semantic to our message algebra. We use E to interpret encryptions, K to interpret key symbols, and H to interpret hashes. We let C : Const → Str be a function that (deterministically) assigns a constant bit string to each constant identifier. We let N : Param → Str be the nonce generation function that, given a unary sequence of length η, chooses uniformly and randomly a bitstring from {0, 1}
η .
Definition 4.3 For a message m, a value of the security parameter η ∈ N, a finite set U of messages containing R(m), and a τ ∈ Coins(U), we can (deterministically) create a bitstring [[m]] τ η ∈ Str as follows:
. For a fixed message m and η ∈ N, choosing τ from the probability distribution Coins(R(m)) creates a probability distribution
Note that although the codomain of τ ∈ Coins(m) is Coins, the set of infinite bitstrings, when interpreting a fixed message m at a fixed value of the security parameter η, only a predetermined finite initial segment of each sequence of coin flips will be used by K, N , E, and H (cf. Definition 3.3). In fact, because these four algorithms run in polynomial time, for every message m there exists a polynomial p m such that every call to one of these four algorithms uses at most the first p m (η) elements of τ . Now define Coins η (m) = {τ | τ : R(m) → {0, 1} pm(η) } and equip this with the uniform probability distribution. Then we can also write when
Furthermore, letting η range over N creates an ensemble of probability distri-
Partial interpretation
For technical reasons throughout the soundness proof, we need to compute the interpretation of a symbolic message while part of its randomness has already been chosen. This section introduces straightforward notation to do so. 
Note that R(m, m ′ ) is the set of all random messages in m except those that only occur as a sub-message of m ′ . We will need a way of interpreting a message as a bitstring when the interpretation of certain sub-messages has already been chosen in some other way.
Definition 4.6 Let η ∈ N, let e be a function from Dom(e) ⊆ Msg to Str and let τ ∈ Coins η (U \ Dom(e)) with U a finite set of messages containing R(m). We interpret a message m using e whenever possible. Otherwise, we use the coin flips assigned by τ to generate an interpretation. 
We also need a way of pre-specifying some of the random choices to be made when interpreting a message. This can also be combined with the previous way of preselecting a part of the interpretation. For a function e from a set Dom(e) ⊆ Msg to Str and τ ∈ Coins η (U) as above, we define
Soundness
This section shows that the interpretation proposed in the previous section is computationally sound. Throughout this section we assume that the encryption scheme K, E, D is type-0 secure (or IND-CCA with pattern modified as in [Her05, MP05] ) and well-spread, and that the probabilistic hash scheme H, V is oracle indistinguishable and collision resistant.
In order to isolate our contribution, we split the function pattern in two parts: one replacing the encryptions and one replacing the hashes. We define the function encpat as in Abadi-Rogaway [AR02] which takes a message m and reduces it to a pattern. This function does not replace hashes. where encpat: Msg × P(Msg) → Msg is defined by
otherwise. where hashpat: Msg × P(Msg) → Msg is defined by
hashpat(m, U) = m in any other case. Proof. The proof follows just like in Abadi-Rogaway [AR02] . Interpreting hashes here is straightforward because their argument is always known, by assumption. We refer the reader to the original paper for a full proof. 2
Before starting the proof of the soundness theorem, we give a sketch for an easy case and point out where the technical problems in the general case are. Consider two messages h(n, 0)n ′ and h(n, 1)n ′ . These are observationally equivalent and we have to prove that [[h(n, 0),
] are computationally indistinguishable. The way to prove this is standard: we assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can distinguish these two ensembles of probability distribution and use it to build an adversary D that break the oracle indistinguishability of the hash scheme H, V . What D has to do is clear: it receives a hash value α which is either H(1 η , ν0) or H(1 η , ν1), and has to guess which one it is. It generates a nonce ν ′ and calls A on αν ′ . Since A can successfully distinguish H(1 η , ν0)ν ′ from H(1 η , ν1)ν ′ , this enables D to break oracle indistinguishability. A problem occurs in the case of the messages h(n, n ′ )n ′ and h(n, 1)n ′ . Receiving a hash value α which is either H(1 η , νν ′ ) or H(1 η , ν1), D cannot just generate a nonce ν ′′ and call A on αν ′′ : the distribution of H(1 η , νν ′ )ν ′ is not equal to that of H(1 η , νν ′ )ν ′′ . The technical solution is to provide the adversary D with access to ν ′ ; this is enough to prove that oracle indistinguishability can then be broken. What is still needed is that the inside of the hash is still "random enough" even if part of it is revealed; in this particular case this means that revealing ν ′ , the inside of that hash is still hidden to D. We now first prove, in general, that it is safe to reveal some of the randomness inside the hash. More accurately, if you pre-specify some, but not all, of the sequences of coins to be chosen when interpreting a message m, then no single bitstring x is exceptionally likely to occur as the interpretation of m. After this lemma, we can prove the soundness result.
Lemma 5.5 Let m be a message, U R(m). Let p be a positive polynomial. Then, for large enough η ∀τ ∈ Coins η (U).∀x ∈ Str :
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of m.
• Consider the case m = m 1 , m 2 . We get by induction hypothesis that the statement holds either for m 1 or m 2 , which suffices for the proof given that concatenating a bitstring might just lower the probability of hitting a particular element.
• The cases m = {|m 1 | } r k and m = 2 r are trivial due to well-spreadness (Definition 3.5).
• The cases ⊠ r and m = h r (m 1 ) follow from collision resistance (Definition 3.8).
• The case m = c does not occur since U must be a proper subset of R(c) = ∅.
• If m is a nonce n, then U = ∅ since it must be a proper subset of R(n) = {n}.
Then
• If m is a key k, then again U = ∅. Suppose that for infinitely many η there is a τ ∈ Coins η (U) and an x ∈ Str for which
Now we build an adversary A F (−),G(−) : Param → {0, 1} that breaks type-0 security.
This adversary generates a random nonce ν and gives it to the oracle F to encrypt. The adversary tries to guess if the oracle was instantiated with E(k, −) or with E(k, 0) by simply randomly generating a key itself and trying to decrypt. We will show that the probability that the oracle and the adversary choose the same key is non-negligible and hence the probability that this adversary guesses correctly is also non-negligible. Omitting G as it is not used by A, we get
(because it is always possible to decrypt with the proper key)
(bounding the first term by the probability of getting x two times)
Theorem 5.6 Let m be a message with a sub-message of the form h
is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary and p a positive polynomial such that
for infinitely many η ∈ N. We will use this to build a distinguisher as in Definition 3.7 that breaks oracle indistinguishability of H, V . Using D τ η we can rephrase (2) as follows:
Note that τ selects the randomness that is shared between the inside of the hash and the outside of the hash; when α is drawn from [[m] ] τ η the randomness that appears only inside the hash is chosen (and the assumption onm means that there is really something to choose); H chooses the randomness for taking the hash; and D τ η itself resolves the randomness that appears only outside the hash. This means that there must be a particular value of τ , sayτ η , such that
Gathering all Dτ We will now show that D breaks the oracle indistinguishability of H, V . For this, let L = {L η } η∈N be a polynomial size family of subsets of Str. We have to show that for infinitely many values of η, there are x, y ∈ Str \ L η such that D meaningfully distinguishes between H(1 η , x) and H(1 η , y). Once again, take one of the infinitely many values of η for which (2) holds. Continuing from (3), we get
(by Lemma 5.5 (2x) using the polynomial 4p(η)|L η |, provided that η is large)
Then, continuing from (4), we get a contradiction:
Therefore, there must be an
Hence D breaks oracle indistinguishability, contradicting the assumption on H, V . 2
Theorem 5.7 (Soundness) Let m and m ′ be acyclic messages. 
Completeness
Although soundness results allow us to port proofs of secrecy properties from the symbolic world to the computational world, it does not permit to port, for instance, authenticity and integrity results. For example, consider a protocol in which an agent A chooses a nonce n and commits to this nonce by sending h(n) to another agent B. Later in the protocol, A will reveal the nonce n by sending n itself to B. Security in this setting means that A cannot change her choice after sending h(n). In the symbolic world, this is guaranteed by the fact that the message h(n)n (the concatenation of the relevant messages in the protocol run) is observationally distinct from h(n)n ′ , with n ′ = n. We would like to be able to conclude from this symbolic property that This section now shows that the interpretation proposed in the Section 4 is complete. Throughout this section we assume that the encryption scheme K, E, D is type-0 secure, well-spread, and confusion free, and that the probabilistic hash scheme H, V is collision resistant and oracle indistinguishable.
Throughout the completeness proof we follow the steps of Micciancio-Warinschi and their notation when possible. We recall here some of their results as they are used in our proof.
In the original Abadi-Rogaway logic, the useful information for an adversary is determined by the set of keys she can learn. We define the function arecover and its computational counterpart brecover as in [MW04a] . There they are called recoverable and getkeys. These functions extract the set of keys observable by an adversary from a symbolic message and a bitstring respectively. and F kr : Msg × P(Key) → P(Key) is given by
in any other case.
The function brecover : Str → P(Keys) is defined by algorithm brecover(µ) :
Gets all the keys in the bitstring µ with high probability.
where C kr : Msg × P(Keys) → P(Keys) is defined by
Note that brecover can be computed in polynomial time: we can assume without loss of generality that the size of the output of the decryption algorithm is smaller than the input ciphertext (since the encryption scheme is randomized). Then C kr recurses a linear number of times and every iteration of the until loop of brecover adds at least one key to U ′ and therefore the number of iterations is bounded by the maximum number of keys in µ.
The following lemma also from [MW04a] shows the relation between these two functions.
Lemma 6.2 Let Π = K, E, D be a confusion free encryption scheme and let m ∈ Msg. Then
Proof. We refer the reader to the original paper for a complete proof of this lemma. The hashes that appear in our logic have no influence at all. 2
In our extended logic, due to the hashes, it is not true any more that the only useful information for an adversary is the set of keys. Any message an adversary can learn might be the pre-image of a certain hash value. Therefore, we need to be able to compute the closure (up to a certain size) of a given message or bitstring. For this reason the closure operators defined below are closed (up to a certain size) under pairing but not under encryption or hashing. Here the function aanalz : Msg × P(Msg) → P(Msg), defined below, splits a message in all its meaningful subterms, using the keys in U, when possible, for decrypting.
The function asynth : P(Msg) × N → P(Msg) generates all possible vectors of messages in U of size up to d:
Next, the functions bclosure : Str × N → P(Str), banalz : Str × P(Str) → P(Str) and bsynth : P(Str)×N → P(Str) are the computational counterparts of aclosure, aanalz and asynth respectively:
where bclosure : Str × N × P(Keys) → P(Str) is defined by
Note that for a fixed d ∈ N, bclosure(µ, d) can be computed in a time that is polynomial in |µ|. Now we show that the proposed functions behave similarly with high probability.
Lemma 6.4 Let m ∈ Msg, d ∈ N and T ⊆ Key. Then the probability
Proof. We prove by induction on the structure of m that the probability
is a negligible function of η. The original statement follows from this, using that asynth and bsynth have similar behavior.
The only non-trivial case is that of
where ε 1 , ε 2 are the negligible functions from the induction hypothesis and confusion freeness respectively.
where ε is a negligible function due to confusion freeness. 2
The following is an extended version of the function psp from [MW04a] , which is the computational counterpart of pattern. This function takes a bitstring as an argument and tries to recover the pattern associated to it. This means that given as input a sample from [[m] ], the function outputs (a renaming of) pattern(m) with high probability. As in [MW04a] we let f be an arbitrary (but fixed) injective function that associates an identifier (i.e., an element of Nonce ∪ Key ∪ Const) to each bitstring of primitive type (i.e., ν, κ, ς).
Definition 6.5 The function psp : Str × P(Str) → Msg is defined by
Theorem 6.6 Let m ∈ Msg and let U be a finite subset of Msg. Then the probability
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of m. We only show here the case m = h r (m 1 ). For the remaining cases, the proof follows similarly to the one in the original Micciancio-Warinschi [MW04a] paper and therefore we refer the reader to it.
• If m 1 ∈ U then
where ε 1 is the negligible function from the induction hypothesis and ε 2 is a negligible function from collision resistance, using that an adversary can
where ε is a negligible function due to collision resistance. 2
Lemma 6.7 Let m ∈ Msg and d ∈ N. Then the probability
Proof.
(where ε 1 is the negligible function due to Theorem 6.6) 
where ε 2 is the negligible function from Lemma 6.7. Therefore, Adv D (η) = 1 − ε 1 (η) − ε 2 (η), which is not negligible. 2
Active adversaries
We now briefly turn our attention to active adversaries. One could view the passive adversaries we have been considering up to now as being given the transcript of a protocol run and trying to deduce information from that. The soundness and completeness results say that the information an adversary could learn in the computational setting is the same as in the symbolic one. Active adversaries, however, can also try to inject messages in the network while the protocol is running. Hence, to obtain a soundness result, every meaningful message that an adversary could send in the computational world, should also be sendable in the symbolic world. Just as IND-CPA is not strong enough for encryption schemes for this to hold -one needs non-malleability [MW04b,Her05,MP05] -oracle hashing is not strong enough for hashes.
We now show an explicit example of an oracle hash scheme where an adversary is capable of creating more messages in the computational world than in the symbolic world.
Let p = 2q + 1 be a large (i.e., scaling with η) safe prime. Consider the oracle hash H(x) = r 2 , r 2·f (x) mod p from Section 3.3. Assume that f is homomorphic for arguments up to length 2η, i.e., f (x + y) = f (x)f (y) mod q when x + y < 2 η . For instance, one could take f (x) = g x mod q when x < 2 η and f (x) = h(x) otherwise, assuming that q is also a safe prime, g is a generator of the quadratic residues modulo q, and h is a collision resistant oneway function. For simplicity, ignore the tagged representation (see Section 4) and assume that the representation of the concatenation of two nonces is just Therefore, in the computational world with this particular oracle hash, an attacker receiving H(ν) = (r 2 , r 2·f (ν) ) is capable of producing H(ν ′ ν) for a nonce ν ′ of her own choice. In the symbolic world, however, this is impossible since h r (n ′ , n) is not in the closure of {h r (n), n ′ }.
Next, we show a very simple one-way authentication protocol that, implemented with a malleable oracle hash function, results in a broken implementation. In this protocol, principal B authenticates to principal A, with whom he shares a symmetric key k AB . The protocol is the following (1) A → B : n (2) B → A : h(k AB , n) Consider a homomorphic implementation H of h, as before. Now suppose that the attacker sees a protocol run: A sends to B a nonce ν, then B replies H(κ AB , ν). Later, the attacker is able to answer a new challenge ν ′ by sending H(κ AB , ν) · H(ν ′ − ν) to A. This results in a successful impersonation of B by the attacker.
The conclusion is that oracle hashing is not strong enough to give a per-fect correspondence between the symbolic world and the computational world when the adversary is active. Just as for encryption schemes, what would be needed is a concept of non-malleability [DDN91] for hashes.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed an interpretation for formal hashes that is computationally sound and complete in the standard model. Under standard assumptions on hashes (pre-image and collision resistance), the symbolic world does not perfectly match the computational world. However, our results show that it is still possible to achieve this perfect match, for passive adversaries, using Canetti's oracle hashing. While considering active adversaries, we have shown that the security definition for oracle hashing is not strong enough. It would be interesting to extend the notion of non-malleability for hashes to achieve this perfect match also for active adversaries.
